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Re-Victimization and the Asylum Process: 
Jimenez Ferreira v. Lynch: Re-Assessing 
the Weight Placed on Credible Fear 
Interviews in Determining Credibility 
Alana Mosley† 
Introduction 
On July 12, 2016, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit held in Jimenez Ferreira v. Lynch that notes from 
a credible fear interview may be an unreliable basis for an adverse 
credibility finding.1  The court also found in this case that both the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and the immigration judge 
improperly overlooked material evidence that corroborated the 
testimony of Ana Veronica Jimenez Ferreira (“Ms. Jimenez”).2  Ms. 
Jimenez fled the Dominican Republic, seeking asylum in the United 
States from her common-law husband, who had repeatedly beaten, 
raped, stalked, and threatened to kill her and her two children.3  
The immigration judge had found her testimony incredible due to 
her failure to note the precise time and location of the attacks.4 
Ms. Jimenez’s story illustrates the struggle many asylees 
experience as they maneuver through the asylum process.  They 
must process their trauma and adequately articulate the nature 
and context of the traumatic event, or events, in a linear narrative 
that an immigration judge will find credible.5  While telling one’s 
story of trauma may often help the healing process, in the asylum 
context, survivors are faced with the possibility of being found 
incredible and being sent back to the country they fled. 
 
 †. J.D. Candidate 2018, University of Minnesota Law School.  I would like to 
thank my parents, Tony and Sylvia Mosley, for their constant encouragement and 
support of my dreams and ambitions.  I would also like to thank the staff and editors 
of Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice for their help preparing this 
Article for publication.  Last, but not least, I must thank my friends, Priscilla 
Willmott and Katelyn Nieman, for always being the support system I can count on 
throughout my journey as a survivor. 
 1. 831 F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 2. Id. at 810. 
 3. Id. at 805. 
 4. Id. at 808. 
 5. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii–iii), 8 U.S.C. § 
1158(b)(1)(B)(ii–iii) (2012). 
316 Law & Inequality [Vol. 36: 315 
This Article will provide an overview of Jimenez Ferreira v. 
Lynch.  Part I outlines the background of Jimenez Ferreira v. Lynch.  
Part II discusses the process of affirmative asylum.  Part III 
provides insight into the concept of re-victimization and the impact 
that past trauma can have on a survivor’s memory.  Next, Part IV 
addresses the nature of credible fear interviews and the training 
provided to the officers who conduct them.  Part V focuses on the 
approaches utilized by different circuits for determining the weight 
given to credible fear interviews.  Finally, Part VI calls for more 
circuits to follow the approach utilized by the Seventh Circuit in 
Jimenez Ferreira v. Lynch. 
I. Background 
Ms. Jimenez, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, applied for 
asylum and withholding of removal in the United States based on 
her particular social group membership, which was described as 
“Dominican women in relationships they cannot leave.”6  Ms. 
Jimenez fled to the United States to escape her abusive common-
law husband, Ramon Holguin (“Mr. Holguin”).7  Her story of 
persecution began in 2007—when she returned home along with her 
children after attending a Christmas party, Mr. Holguin beat, 
choked, and raped her in their bedroom.8  She tried to escape 
physical harm by staying at a friend’s house and filing a complaint 
with the police in the Dominican Republic.9  Mr. Holguin was 
arrested, but released from jail four days later.10  He began stalking 
Ms. Jimenez at her workplace and threatened to kill her if she and 
her children did not come back to live with him.11 
Out of fear for both her and her children’s lives, she quit her 
job and moved approximately fifty miles away to her hometown of 
Bonao to stay with her mother.12  In 2009, Mr. Holguin managed to 
find her and break into her mother’s home, where he beat and 
threatened Ms. Jimenez until her mother called for the aid of 
neighbors.13  Two months later, Mr. Holguin returned, kidnapped 
 
 6. See Jimenez Ferreira, 831 F.3d at 805. 
 7. Id. at 806. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. (“There is no indication in the record that he was ever prosecuted for the 
incident.”). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 806–07. 
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Ms. Jimenez by forcing her into his car, and raped her in the 
woods.14  After this assault, Mr. Holguin continued to harass her by 
sending letters threatening to kill her and the children if she did 
not return to him.15  Out of fear that Mr. Holguin would kill her, 
Ms. Jimenez fled to the United States to seek asylum with the hope 
of being able to bring her children to the United States if her asylum 
was granted.16 
Ms. Jimenez entered the United States in Texas and was 
immediately detained by United States Border Patrol.17  Three 
weeks later, she told an asylum officer that she was fleeing from her 
common-law husband.18  The credible fear interview took place over 
the telephone while Ms. Jimenez was in detention.  Since Ms. 
Jimenez only speaks Spanish, an interpreter had to relay the 
information to the asylum officer.19  The asylum officer found that 
“[t]here [was] a significant possibility that the assertions 
underlying [Ms. Jimenez’s] claim could be found credible in a full 
asylum or withholding of removal hearing.”20  However, the 
immigration judge held that Ms. Jimenez was ineligible for asylum 
and withholding of removal on the basis that Ms. Jimenez was not 
credible due to “glaring inconsistencies,” and because Ms. Jimenez 
lacked evidence to support her testimony.21 
The “glaring inconsistencies” that bothered the immigration 
judge the most related to the 2007 attack.22  The police complaint 
and the notes from Ms. Jimenez’s credible fear interview gave the 
impression that Mr. Holguin attacked her before she and her 
children left for the Christmas party, but at her 2013 removal 
 
 14. Id. at 807. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id.  Despite Ms. Jimenez’s flight to the United States, Mr. Holguin continued 
to send letters to her mother threatening “to kill them all.”  Ms. Jimenez’s mother 
reported the letters to police, but police in the Dominican Republic, Ms. Jimenez 
alleges, “don’t help the women” and “don’t do anything.”  Id. 
 17. Id. at 806.  When she was first detained, an immigration officer asked her if 
she feared returning to the Dominican Republic and Ms. Jimenez stated that she did 
not.  Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 807–08; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2012) (“Where the trier of 
fact determines that the applicant should provide evidence that corroborates 
otherwise credible testimony, such evidence must be provided . . . .”). 
 22. See Jimenez Ferreira v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 809, 808 (7th Cir. 2016).  Other 
inconsistencies between Ms. Jimenez’s testimony in court and her credible fear 
interview were the date she was last raped, where she was last raped, and whether 
Mr. Holguin had hit her son.  Id. 
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hearing, Ms. Jimenez stated that the violence happened when she 
returned home from the party.23  The immigration judge overlooked 
the medical report which noted the injuries that Ms. Jimenez 
suffered due to this attack.24  On appeal, the BIA upheld the 
immigration judge’s decision.25  On further appeal, the Seventh 
Circuit found that Ms. Jimenez had consistently maintained that 
Mr. Holguin raped her on Christmas Eve and that the medical 
report strongly supported her claim.26  Thus, the precise time of day 
that the violence occurred was found to be a trivial discrepancy that 
the immigration judge should not use as the basis for an adverse 
credibility finding.27 
II. The Process of Affirmative Asylum 
Applying for asylum is a process by which an immigrant may 
seek protection in the United States based on past persecution they 
have suffered or based on a well-founded fear of future persecution, 
due to their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group, or political opinion.28  The purpose of asylum law is to 
provide a safe haven to those who meet these statutory 
requirements.29  To be found eligible, an immigrant must be 
physically present in the United States or seeking entry into the 
United States at a port of entry and must file an affirmative asylum 
claim within one year of their arrival.30  Some asylum seekers may 
be excluded on the grounds that they can relocate to another area 
of their home country safely or had previously resettled safely in a 
third country prior to coming to the United States.31 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 807 (“[B]ruises and scratches on [Ms.] Jimenez’s body, as well as ‘visible 
signs and marks of a strangulation attempt’ and a ‘torn inner and outer labia of the 
vagina, evidencing penetration by force or with resistance on the part of the 
victim.’”). 
 25. Id. at 808. 
 26. Id. at 811. 
 27. Id.; see also Tawuo v. Lynch, 799 F.3d 725, 727 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that 
inconsistencies cited by immigration judges “should not be trivial”). 
 28. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2012); see also Asylum, USCIS, 
https://www.uscis.gov/ humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum (last updated May 12, 
2017). 
 29. § 1159(b). 
 30. § 1158(a)(2)(B); The Affirmative Asylum Process, USCIS (Feb. 23, 2016), 
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/affirmative-asylum-
process. 
 31. § 1158(a)(2)(A). 
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With affirmative asylum, the applicant will file their asylum 
application, Form I-589, with the United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS).32  In this situation, the applicant is 
present within the United States, but is not in removal proceedings.  
Next, the USCIS will have the applicant come in for an initial 
background check and get the applicant’s fingerprints.33  Then, the 
USCIS will schedule an asylum interview, also known as a credible 
fear interview, between the applicant and an asylum officer.34  In 
this interview, the asylum officer will determine whether the 
applicant is eligible for asylum and whether the applicant is 
credible.35  Within weeks, a credibility determination is rendered, 
and one of five possible decisions will be given: 
[A] grant of asylum; referral to an immigration court; 
recommended approval; notice of intent to deny; or denial of 
asylum . . . .  A decision to refer the applicant to an immigration 
court usually occurs if the applicant is not in valid status at the 
time of the asylum interview and USCIS was unable to grant 
asylum during the initial proceedings.36 
Separately, in defensive asylum, the applicant is already in removal 
proceedings and is claiming asylum as a defense to removal.37  This 
process happens in immigration court as a trial and, thus, is more 
adversarial. 
While it may be relatively simple to define many of the 
protected grounds, such as race and nationality, there has been 
more debate surrounding the definition of particular social 
groups.38  The United States and other common law countries tend 
to follow the “protected characteristic” approach.39  Under this 
 
 32. The Affirmative Asylum Process, supra note 30. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Preparing for Your Asylum Interview: What to Expect on the Day of Your 
Interview, USCIS (May 12, 2017), https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-
asylum/asylum/preparing-your-asylum-interview. 
 36. Maureen E. Cummins, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Asylum: Why 
Procedural Safeguards Are Necessary, 29 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 283, 302 
(2013). 
 37. Id. at 296. 
 38. See generally Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging Importance of “Social 
Visibility” in Defining a Particular Social Group and Its Potential Impact on Asylum 
Claims Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 47 (2008) 
(highlighting the evolution of the definition of “particular social group” since In re 
Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985)). 
 39. Id. at 48.  “Australia, on the other hand, has emphaszied [sic] social 
perceptions, while also taking immutable characteristics into account.”  Id. at 49.  
The social perceptions approach focuses more on common traits shared by a group, 
and whether “the group is set apart from other members of society.”  Id. at 58.  The 
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approach, a particular social group is found where “members have 
a ‘common immutable characteristic’ that they ‘either cannot 
change, or should not be required to change because it is 
fundamental to their individual identities or consciences.’”40  The 
BIA expanded this approach when it introduced the “social 
visibility” test.41  This test requires that individual group members, 
not simply the group itself, be recognizable to the public—a 
standard which may be problematic in asylum claims based on 
gender-based harm such as  domestic violence, since victims may 
hide their situation from others.42  This silence could be due to 
shame, fear, social tolerance towards domestic violence, financial 
dependence on their abuser, or other reasons.43 
The BIA spoke to this issue in 2014 when it issued its decision 
in In re A-R-C-G- that seemed to better recognize gender-based 
harm claims in asylum adjudication.44  The BIA’s new test requires 
that a social group be “(1) composed of members who share a 
common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with ‘particularity,’ 
and (3) socially distinct within the society in question.”45  In its 
decision, the BIA recognized “married women in Guatemala who 
are unable to leave their relationship” as a particular social group 
that met each of the three prongs (i.e., immutability, particularity, 
and social distinction).46  Despite this precedent, victims of domestic 
violence still face obstacles in establishing the nexus between the 
protected ground and past persecution47 in proving that their 
government is either unable or unwilling to help them,48 and in 
being found credible. 
Applicants’ asylum claims often come down to whether, or not, 
an immigration judge finds them to be credible.49  The credibility 
 
group does not have to be recognized by society, instead it must only be 
distinguishable from society.  Id. 
 40. Id. at 51–52 (quoting In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233). 
 41. Id. at 63. 
 42. Id. at 95. 
 43. Id. 
 44. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (BIA 2014) (finding “married women in 
Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” to be an acceptable particular 
social group). 
 45. Blaine Bookey, Gender-Based Asylum Post-Matter of A-R-C-G-: Evolving 
Standards and Fair Application of the Law, 22 SW. J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (2016). 
 46. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 388. 
 47. Bookey, supra note 45, at 16. 
 48. Id. at 17. 
 49. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2012) (“The testimony of the applicant may 
be sufficient to sustain the applicant’s burden without corroboration, but only if the 
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determination may be based on “the totality of the circumstances,” 
including: 
the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or 
witness, the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s or witness’s 
account, the consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s 
written and oral statements . . . the internal consistency of each 
such statement, the consistency of such statements with other 
evidence of record . . . and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in 
such statements . . . .50 
The asylum process can be very emotional for survivors of 
persecution due to the reality that their eligibility for asylum will 
require that they share very detailed information about the type of 
persecution suffered and about their persecutor.  Moreover, due to 
the nature of the immigration process, their narrative will not 
simply be accepted as truth, but instead will be doubted and combed 
for inconsistencies.  The experience of “reliving” persecution while 
being judged for credibility may cause asylum seekers to be re-
victimized. 
III. Re-victimization and the Impact of Past Trauma 
The impact of past trauma can affect a survivor’s conduct and 
memory.51  Symptoms of trauma may be categorized into three 
types:  hyperarousal, intrusion, and constriction.52  Hyperarousal 
symptoms may cause one to be easily startled, go into permanent 
states of alert, or struggle to sleep;53 intrusion symptoms may cause 
survivors to have flashbacks or to “relive” both the traumatic event 
and the emotional intensity of that event, over and over again;54  
constriction symptoms may cause survivors to respond or behave 
with emotional detachment or indifference, and they may be so 
numb to reality that events may be altered to seem as if they 
happened to someone else.55  A critical piece of the healing process 
 
applicant satisfies the trier of fact that the applicant’s testimony is credible . . . .”); 
see also Margaret Graham Tebo, Asylum Ordeals, ABA J. (Nov. 2006), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/asylum_ordeals (“[O]ften documents 
are unavailable and so proofs rest on the credibility of the petitioner’s and witnesses’ 
testimony . . . .”) 
 50. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). 
 51. Stephen Paskey, Telling Refugee Stories: Trauma, Credibility, and the 
Adversarial Adjudication of Claims for Asylum, 56 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 457, 484 
(2016). 
 52. Id. at 485–86. 
 53. Id. at 486. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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for many survivors of past trauma is the act of repeatedly telling 
their story.56  The ability to describe a traumatic event often relies 
on memories of specific sensations and images, so it can be difficult 
to describe the event in a linear narrative or with everyday 
descriptors.57  Due to this difficulty of (1) reconciling the event for 
themselves and (2) conveying this trauma to someone who may have 
never experienced something similar, a survivor’s story may tend to 
shift or be revised with each narration as they attempt to compile 
all of the images and sensations into their own linear narrative of 
the event.58 
This shifting narrative can be problematic in the asylum 
context since an immigration judge will likely be focused on 
determining whether the asylum seeker is credible.59  Thus, any 
inconsistencies between the narrative told during the credible fear 
interview and the court hearing could pose a threat to the asylum 
seeker’s claim.  This idea of re-victimization, or re-traumatization, 
is based on the reality that asylum applicants are faced both with 
the uncertainty of whether they will be believed by others and the 
fear for their future due to the possibility of being forced to return 
to the persecution in their homeland. 
IV. Credible Fear Interviews 
In respect to affirmative asylum claims,60 credible fear 
interviews are intended to be non-adversarial in nature, and 
“asylum officers have an affirmative duty to elicit all information 
relevant to the legal determination.”61  Moreover, “[t]he applicant 
must use as many details as possible to establish his [or her] well-
founded fear of persecution in order to qualify as a refugee.”62  
Factors that may influence an asylum officer’s determination are:  
the credibility of the applicant, home country conditions, current 
United States asylum law, and international human rights law.63  
“[I]f the officer determines that an [applicant] does not have a 
 
 56. Id. at 490. 
 57. Id. at 488. 
 58. Id. at 488–89. 
 59. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2012). 
 60. See Cummins, supra note 36, at 301 (noting that those making defensive 
asylum claims “must undergo a trial proceeding instead of an interview”). 
 61. USCIS, LESSON PLAN OVERVIEW: CREDIBLE FEAR, ASYLUM DIVISION OFFICER 
TRAINING COURSE 12 (Feb. 28, 2014). 
 62. Cummins, supra note 36, at 300. 
 63. Id. at 299. 
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credible fear of persecution, the officer shall order the [applicant] 
removed from the United States without further hearing or 
review.”64  After an adverse credibility determination by an asylum 
officer, the applicant will be placed in “mandatory detention until 
he [or she] is removed from the United States.”65 
The USCIS, as an agency of the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS),66 employs and trains asylum officers.67  Few officers 
are lawyers, but officers do receive training as to relevant 
immigration and asylum law.68  As for training, the USCIS requires 
that all asylum officers complete the Asylum Officer Basic Training 
Course, which is a five-week course where asylum officers are 
trained on subjects such as international refugee law, United States 
asylum law, interviewing techniques, decision-making, and 
writing.69  Additionally, “[a]ll asylum office staff are . . . required to 
attend USCIS trainings . . . offered through the USCIS Academy.”70  
Separate trainings are offered to provide insight into interviewing 
survivors of torture, in particular, how to identify victims of 
trafficking, and issues specific to women.71  Asylum interviews are 
not recorded, so the only record will be the officer’s written or typed 
notes.72  “In 2014, asylum officers granted 47% of the 27,006 claims 
they adjudicated, while 50% of [claims] were referred to 





 64. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 235(b)(l)(B)(iii)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 
1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I); but see Cummins, supra note 36, at 299 (stating that 
immigration judges will give “prompt review” to an applicant’s case before the actual 
removal is executed). 
 65. Cummins, supra note 36, at 299. 
 66. See generally Our History, USCIS (May 25, 2011), https://www.uscis.gov/
about-us/our-history (stating that there are three components within DHS:  USCIS, 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP)). 
 67. See Asylum Division Training Programs, USCIS https://www.uscis.gov/
humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/asylum-division-training-programs (last 
updated Dec. 19, 2016). 
 68. See Paskey, supra note 51, at 468. 
 69. Asylum Division Training Programs, supra note 67. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See Paskey, supra note 51, at 468. 
 73. Id. at 470; see also USCIS, AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM APPLICATION STATISTICS 
AND DECISIONS ANNUAL REPORT 3 (June 20, 2016). 
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V. Approaches for Determining the Weight Given to 
Credible Fear Interviews 
A. Assessing the Quality of the Interview and Notes 
Jimenez was decided in the wake of Moab v. Gonzales, in which 
the Seventh Circuit held that too much weight was placed on the 
credible fear interview in making a credibility determination 
involving an applicant who did not mention his sexual orientation 
during the credible fear interview because he was afraid that he 
would be further persecuted on that basis.74  Similarly, the Seventh 
Circuit held in Dong v. Gonzales that airport interviews “are not 
always reliable indicators of credibility.”75  The Seventh Circuit 
adopted the Second Circuit’s “list of nonexclusive factors” for 
“determining the reliability of an asylum applicant’s preliminary 
interview.”76  To determine whether the notes from a credible fear 
interview are reliable, the Third Circuit looks at (1) whether the 
record of the interview is a verbatim transcript of the conversation, 
or simply a summary; (2) whether follow-up questions were asked 
in order to get more details relating to the asylum claim; (3) whether 
the applicant is reluctant to talk to government officials due to 
negative past experiences with government officials in their home 
country; and (4) whether the applicant’s answers sound as though 
they understood the questions being asked of them.77  Conversely, 
the Second Circuit finds an inherent difference in the nature of 
asylum interviews and airport interviews, thus it treats them 
differently and does not see the same need to assess the reliability 
of asylum interviews.78 
 
 74. Moab v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 656, 660–61 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 75. 421 F.3d 573, 579 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 76. Moab, 500 F.3d at 661.  See generally Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 
169, 179–80 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that the Second Circuit, likewise, adopted the 
Third Circuit’s list of factors to determine whether notes from an airport interview 
could be considered reliable). 
 77. Ramsameachire, 357 F.3d at 180. 
 78. See S. KATHLEEN PEPPER & FATIMAH A. MATEEN, ASYLUM CREDIBILITY AND 
CORROBORATING EVIDENCE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS AND IN THE BOARD 
OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS OUTLINE 31 (2006), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/
cba6/68cac2622b7d2831e4d8b8fc5bb2aee04e17.pdf (last updated Mar. 2011); cf. id. 
at 53 (stating that the Third Circuit views the context and flaws of an asylum 
interview and airport interview as similar). 
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B. Judicial Discretion 
The Eleventh Circuit has chosen not to take the approach 
utilized by the Seventh and Second Circuits.79  Rather, the Eleventh 
Circuit gives full discretion to immigration judges to determine 
whether notes from credible fear interviews are sufficient and 
reliable.80  Likewise, Congress, through the REAL ID Act,81 gives 
immigration judges substantial discretion,82 both in making 
credibility determinations and in choosing the factors on which they 
base these determinations.83  However, the Eleventh Circuit does 
utilize the specific, cogent reason standard.84  When a judge bases 
an adverse credibility finding on inconsistencies between the notes 
from the credible fear interview and the asylum seeker’s personal 
testimony or asylum application, the Eleventh Circuit has held that 
the immigration judge’s finding will only be upheld if it was 
supported by specific, cogent reasons.85 
While the specific, cogent reason standard does help to avoid 
adverse credibility findings based on immaterial inconsistencies, it 
does not push immigration judges to further question applicants 
and attempt to reconcile material inconsistencies that may have 
valid explanations.86  This makes it especially important that 
asylum seekers strive to convey a linear narrative that outsiders 
can follow, because a shifting narrative could be viewed as a 
specific, cogent reason for an adverse credibility finding. 
 
 79. See Yan Jin Zao v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 192 F. App’x 825, 827 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(stating that the court had “never held that it is reversible error for an [immigration 
judge] to fail to evaluate an airport statement using these factors”). 
 80. Id. But see Pepper & Mateen, supra note 78, at 158–159 (“[A]irport 
statements should not form the exclusive basis of an adverse credibility finding.”). 
 81. Pub. L. No.109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005). 
 82. But cf. Kadia v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 817, 821 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Deference is 
earned; it is not a birthright.”). 
 83. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2012); accord id at (iii). 
 84. See Pepper, supra note 78, at 152 (“An Immigration Judge’s adverse 
credibility finding must be supported by ‘specific, cogent reasons.’”). 
 85. See Chen v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 463 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing 
Forgue v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 401 F.3d 1282, 1287 (11th Cir. 2005)). 
 86. See generally Aden v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 966, 968–69 (8th Cir. 2005).  
Concurring Judge Heaney agreed that the immigration judge found specific, cogent 
reasons to find the applicant’s testimony incredible, but stated that “[i]t would have 
been very helpful had the [immigration judge] taken the time . . . to attempt to 
resolve the inconsistencies.”  This was especially so since the applicant would have 
been qualified for relief had she been able to reconcile her story.  Id. 
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VI. Analysis of the Jimenez Ferreira v. Lynch Decision 
Asylum seekers often arrive with little to no corroborating 
evidence to support their asylum petition.87  Therefore, their 
narrative of the traumatic event, or events, is often their main 
evidence of the past persecution that they have suffered.  However, 
in Ms. Jimenez’s case, she provided “over 400 pages of documentary 
evidence” with her petition for asylum, including the police 
complaint from her 2007 sexual assault, a doctor’s report, and a 
psychologist’s report.88  The doctor’s report stated that Ms. Jimenez 
had “‘visible signs and marks of a strangulation attempt’ and a ‘torn 
inner and outer labia of the vagina, evidencing penetration by force 
or with resistance on the part of the victim.’”89  Similarly, the 
psychologist’s report mentioned that she showed “signs and 
symptoms of tension, worry, fear for her life and the lives of her 
family[,]” and recommended that Ms. Jimenez “‘be referred 
immediately to group therapy’ to ‘help her overcome the trauma.’”90  
Despite having material evidence that corroborated her story, Ms. 
Jimenez’s testimony was still not accepted as credible.  This is a 
reality that many asylum seekers face.  Despite their best efforts, 
their traumatic experiences “may not be accurately legitimated and 
accepted by outsiders,” such as asylum officers or immigration 
judges.91 
One must consider whether it is possible to effectively judge 
the credibility of a person coping with trauma within an adversarial 
system.  Judges use factors such as demeanor, candor, and the 
internal consistency of each statement to determine an applicant’s 
credibility.92  However, these factors can be poor gauges when 
considering the difficulty many survivors of abuse or persecution 
have in articulating a linear narrative that effectively summarizes 
their experiences.93  Similarly, the applicant may feel shame or 
 
 87. See USCIS, INTERVIEWING SURVIVORS OF TORTURE AND OTHER SEVERE 
TRAUMA: TRAINING MODULE 25 subd. 10.2 (Oct. 11, 2012), available at 
https://refugeerights.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Interviewing-Survivors-of-
Torture-2015.pdf. 
 88. Jimenez Ferreira v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 803, 807 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See Erin Rider, Asylum Seekers’ Credibility Burden: Managing Trauma in 
the Asylum Process Without Collective Support, 2 J. OF SOC. & SOC. WORK 263, 269 
(2014). 
 92. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2012). 
 93. This is especially so when language is an additional barrier to the process.  
In Ms. Jimenez’s case, her credible fear interview was conducted while in detention 
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embarrassment in disclosing the abuse they suffered.94  Ms. 
Jimenez personally felt this:  she testified “that she was ashamed 
and ‘embarrassed’ to discuss Holguin’s abuse.”95  Similarly, a 
shifting narrative may very well be an applicant’s attempt to 
grapple with the extent of the trauma they have suffered, and thus, 
they may still be trying to reconcile their situation for themselves.  
In addition to having to accept the facts of their claim for 
themselves, applicants must also persuade outsiders that they can, 
and should, be believed. 
As previously mentioned, the impact of past trauma can affect 
a survivor’s conduct and memory.96  While in detention, Ms. 
Jimenez did not immediately disclose to her detaining officers that 
she feared having to return to the Dominican Republic, “because 
she was nervous, afraid and ashamed to tell the male officer 
conducting the interview about her ex-husband’s abuse.”97  Upon 
expressing her fear of returning, she was given a credible fear 
interview.98  “Ms. Jimenez was confused and nervous during her 
credible fear interview, and embarrassed to be telling the intimate 
details of her relationship with Holguin to a complete stranger and 
an unknown telephonic interpreter.”99  However, despite these 
barriers, the asylum officer found Ms. Jimenez to have a credible 
fear of persecution and, thus, she was released.100  In contrast, the 
immigration judge was not similarly persuaded and found Ms. 
Jimenez incredible based on “glaring inconsistencies.”101 
The issue with the current state of determining credibility 
within the immigration court setting is that the focus is not actually 
on the facts of the case, but instead the applicant’s unwavering 
 
with an asylum officer and a telephonic interpreter.  See Jimenez Ferreira, 831 F.3d 
at 806.  Some of the inconsistencies that the immigration judge noted were due to 
breakdowns in translation during the credible fear interview.  See Brief for Petitioner 
at 21–28, Jimenez Ferreira v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-2603); 
accord Jimenez Ferreira, 831 F.3d at 807–08. 
 94. See generally Brief for Petitioner, supra note 93, at 30 (“Ms. Jimenez testified 
that Holguin’s physical and sexual abuse had a significant impact on her emotional 
and mental well-being, to the extent that her family insisted she see a therapist, but 
that it is still extremely difficult for her to discuss the physical and sexual abuse to 
this day.”). 
 95. Id. 
 96. See Paskey, supra note 51, at 484. 
 97. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 93, at 8. 
 98. Id. at 9. 
 99. Id. at 17. 
 100. Id. at 9. 
 101. Jimenez Ferreira v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 803, 807 (7th Cir. 2016). 
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consistency in relaying traumatic details.102  Note that in Jimenez, 
the immigration judge overlooked the medical report, which noted 
the injuries Ms. Jimenez suffered due to the 2007 Christmas Eve 
attack103 and instead focused on her timeline of those events—i.e., 
whether Mr. Holguin beat and raped her before or after the party 
on Christmas Eve.104  Thus, the immigration judge placed the 
emphasis on the time of the attack, rather than the actual attack.  
The persecution suffered was the attack itself, which could be 
corroborated with the medical report, psychologist’s report, and 
police complaint.  The technical issues should not be completely 
ignored, because finding material inconsistencies may be a sign of 
a fraudulent asylum claim.  At the same time, minor technical 
issues should not be the basis of an immigration judge’s 
determination, especially where corroborating evidence exists. 
The Fifth Amendment guarantees asylum seekers, and more 
generally “person[s],”105 a due process “right to have a claim heard 
by a neutral, impartial arbiter.”106  The importance of impartiality 
is reaffirmed in the Ethics and Professionalism Guide for 
Immigration Judges, which states that judges should perform their 
responsibilities without showing prejudice.107  However, an asylum 
seeker’s fate will be greatly impacted by which judge presides over 
his or her case, as well as the region of the United States where the 
case is heard.108  While the national average asylum grant rate was 
48% in 2015, many regions had much lower grant rates:  Atlanta, 
Georgia (2%), Las Vegas, Nevada (7%), Dallas, Texas (9%), Houston, 
Texas (9%), Charlotte, North Carolina (13%), and Detroit, Michigan 
(14%).109  Similarly, the United States Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) noted significant variations in asylum outcomes 
 
 102. See Graham Tebo, supra note 49 (stating that the “credibility determination 
is where some immigration judges seem to go off the rails, according to circuit court 
opinions”). 
 103. Jimenez Ferreira, 831 F.3d at 807–08. 
 104. Id. at 808. 
 105. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 106. James L. Buchwalter, Existence and Effect of Bias by Immigration Judge, 45 
A.L.R. FED. 2D 219 § 2. 
 107. See EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., ETHICS AND PROFESSIONALISM GUIDE FOR 
IMMIGRATION JUDGES IX (2011). 
 108. Due Process Denied: Central Americans Seeking Asylum and Legal Protection 
in the United States, AM. IMMIGR. LAWYERS ASS’N at 22 (June 16, 2016). 
 109. Id.  Cf. Paskey, supra note 51, at 509 (“At the opposite end of the spectrum, 
judges in New York City granted 84% of the claims they adjudicated.  The grant rate 
was also higher than average in Arlington, Virginia (71%); Honolulu (74%); 
Philadelphia (59%); and San Francisco (59%).”). 
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depending on the court’s region and the judge hearing the case.110  
For instance, “affirmative applicants in San Francisco were . . . 12 
times more likely than those in Atlanta to be granted asylum.”111  
Some blame judicial bias and the role of politics in appointing 
immigration judges;112 others blame a backlogged and broken 
system.113  “Weighed down by a backlog of more than 520,000 cases, 
the United States immigration courts are foundering, increasingly 
failing to deliver timely, fair decisions to people fighting deportation 
or asking for refuge . . . .”114  This overwhelming case load also 
undermines the gravity of the decisions that immigration judges are 
being asked to make.115  The years of waiting injure asylum seekers 
because they face the reality that their evidence may become stale 
and their memory of past events will decay.  For Ms. Jimenez, her 
hearing occurred in 2013, but many of the relevant events that she 
was expected to relay in detail occurred between 2007 and 2009.116  
There was an expectation that Ms. Jimenez be able to remember 
and articulate, in a linear narrative, specific details of events that 
had happened nearly four to six years prior.117  In her case, the 
immigration judge was concerned about discrepancies as to details, 
 
 110. U.S. Asylum System: Significant Variation Existed in Asylum Outcomes 
Across Immigration Courts and Judges, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. (Sept. 
2008), http://www.gao.gov/assets/290/281817.pdf (highlighting findings of the GAO-
08-940 Report, which found that nine factors greatly affected the variability in 
asylum outcomes, one such factor being the gender of the immigration judge). 
 111. Id. 
 112. See, e.g., Elise Foley, Here’s Why Atlanta Is One of The Worst Places To Be 
An Undocumented Immigrant, HUFFINGTON POST (May 25, 2016), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/deportation-raids-immigration-courts_us_
574378d9e4b0613b512b0f37 (“The process is supposed to be apolitical, but it hasn’t 
always been—President George W. Bush’s administration for years asked certain 
immigration judges about their political views.  Those vetted judges . . . were more 
likely than others to deny asylum.”); Julia Preston, Deluged Immigration Courts, 
Where Cases Stall for Years, Begin to Buckle, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/01/us/deluged-immigration-courts-where-cases-
stall-for-years-begin-to-buckle.html (noting that immigration courts tend to be 
affected more by federal political changes because they fall under the Department of 
Justice, whereas other federal courts fall under the judiciary). 
 113. See Preston, supra note 112, at 2 (“With too few judges, overworked clerks 
and an antiquated docket based on stacks of paper files, many of the 56 courts 
nationwide have become crippled by delays and bureaucratic breakdowns.”). 
 114. Id. 
 115. See Stuart L. Lustig, et al., Inside the Judges’ Chambers: Narrative 
Responses from the National Association of Immigration Judges Stress and Burnout 
Survey, 23 GEO. IMM. L.J. 57, 73 (“This job is supposed to be about doing justice.  The 
conditions under which we work make it more and more challenging to ensure that 
justice is done.”). 
 116. Jimenez Ferreira v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 803, 806 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 117. Id. 
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such as what time of day she was raped on Christmas Eve in 2007, 
the exact date she was last raped, the location she was last raped, 
and whether Mr. Holguin had hit her son.118  There are general 
issues confronting a survivor’s ability to articulate a linear 
narrative regarding traumatic events, but these issues may also be 
compounded by the long length of time it takes to get a hearing. 
Aside from the problems created by the backlog of cases, there 
are also disparities in denial rates within jurisdictions that make 
judicial bias, political sway, and general inexperience more likely 
culprits.  For instance, in July 2006, Transactional Records Access 
Clearinghouse, a research organization associated with Syracuse 
University, released a study stating that Chinese immigrants make 
up almost twenty-two percent of asylum seekers in the United 
States.119  The study found that in New York there was a grave 
disparity in the grant rates for Chinese asylees represented by 
lawyers––one judge denied almost seven percent of petitions, while 
another denied ninety-four percent.120  Circuit courts have 
questioned the skill and temperament of some immigration judges, 
mainly those who have been repeatedly appealed.121  Note that 
“[a]bout half of the judges appointed in [the] 2004-2007 period had 
no experience with immigration law.”122 
The purpose of the credible fear interview is to “identify 
potentially meritorious claims to protection.”123  Similarly, USCIS 
training materials describe the credible fear interview as simply a 
“screening process,”124 yet in Ms. Jimenez’s case, the notes from her 
credible fear interview held substantial weight before the 
immigration judge.125  The inconsistencies between these notes and 
 
 118. Id. at 807–08. 
 119. See Graham Tebo, supra note 49. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Foley, supra note 112. 
 123. USCIS, ASYLUM DIVISION OFFICER TRAINING COURSE: CREDIBLE FEAR 11 
(Feb. 28, 2014), http://cmsny.org/wp-content/uploads/credible-fear-of-persecution-
and-torture.pdf. 
 124. See id. at 17. 
 125. Jimenez Ferreira v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 803, 807–08 (7th Cir. 2016) (“The 
[immigration judge] was especially troubled by the fact that ‘[b]oth the police 
complaint and her credible-fear interview indicate that [Ms. Jimenez] was not 
attacked by Holguin after she returned from the dinner party on Christmas Eve, as 
she testified at her hearing, but that the violence occurred before she was able to go 
to the party . . . .”); see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 93, at 10 (“The 
[immigration judge]’s decision rests primarily on perceived inconsistencies between 
the summary translation of Ms. Jimenez’s credible fear interview and her testimony 
at her hearing and her documentary evidence.”). 
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the applicant’s testimony often serve as the basis for adverse 
credibility findings without much concern about the reliability of 
those notes.126  In Jimenez, the Seventh Circuit found that Ms. 
Jimenez had consistently maintained that Mr. Holguin raped her 
on Christmas Eve and that the medical report corroborated her 
claim.127  Thus, the possible discrepancies—regarding the precise 
time of day that the violence occurred—between the interview notes 
and Ms. Jimenez’s testimony, asylum application, and 
corroborating evidence was found to be a trivial discrepancy for the 
immigration judge to use as the basis for an adverse credibility 
finding.128  More than that, the Seventh Circuit was concerned by 
how much weight was placed on Ms. Jimenez’s credible fear 
interview, since it was not a verbatim transcript, and because it 
should not have been given more weight than all of the supporting 
evidence she provided.129 
Courts should question the reliability of credible fear interview 
notes due to the nature of those interviews.130  The asylum officer’s 
notes are the only record of the interview.131  A verbatim transcript 
would provide a judge with more insight into the nature of the 
questions and answers, rather than a simple summary of the 
dialogue.132  Similarly, a verbatim transcript would allow the judge 
to see whether the asylum officer asked relevant follow-up 
questions to seek more details and information from the 
applicant.133  For instance, Ms. Jimenez’s responses to some of the 
asylum officer’s questions give the impression that she either “did 
not understand [the] question[] . . . or that the interpretation was 
unclear to her.”134  If the notes are only a summary, then the judge 
 
 126. Cf.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 93, at 10–11 (stating that the immigration 
judge’s “decision ignored or discounted Ms. Jimenez’s consistent and compelling 
testimony, both at the hearing and in her original asylum application and 
accompanying affidavit, and the substance of the corroborating evidence she 
submitted to the [immigration judge].”). 
 127. Jimenez Ferreira, 831 F.3d at 811. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 810. 
 130. Recall that Ms. Jimenez’s credible fear interview took place in detention with 
an asylum officer and a telephonic translator.  See id. at 806. 
 131. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 93, at 15 n.3 (arguing that the 
Government offered no further evidence “to bolster or supplement the notes”). 
 132. Cf. id. at 14–15 (stating that the asylum officer’s summary notes from Ms. 
Jimenez’s credible fear interview were “incomplete” and “often incoherent . . . as 
evidenced by numerous grammatical and syntactical lapses.”). 
 133. Id. at 15. 
 134. Id. 
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has no way of knowing whether the applicant’s answers were 
evasive and vague, or whether the asylum officer failed to ask the 
appropriate follow-up questions to gain more insight into, and 
details from, the applicant’s story.135  Moreover, a verbatim record 
would allow the judge to interpret the nature of the interaction 
between the officer and the applicant.  For example, the applicant 
may indicate reluctance in terms of talking to government officials 
based on negative experiences in his or her homeland.  In Ms. 
Jimenez’s case, she had filed a complaint with the police in the 
Dominican Republic, and based on this, Mr. Holguin was arrested— 
but he was released from jail four days later.136  Ms. Jimenez had 
voiced a distrust of law enforcement in the Dominican Republic.137  
Thus, it would not be difficult to understand that she may similarly 
have been reluctant to speak to the United States asylum officer 
regarding a topic as sensitive as past physical and sexual abuse.138  
In general, these factors come down to verifying that the asylum 
officer’s notes serve as a reliable record of the credible fear interview 
and, thus, a reliable tool to use in determining an applicant’s overall 
credibility.  This approach seems to look at decisions based 
primarily on credible fear interview notes as being a red flag, 
therefore, the Seventh Circuit stresses the importance of assessing 
the reliability of these notes before using them as the basis for an 
adverse credibility determination.139 
Conclusion 
Reforming the immigration system has been a topic of 
discussion for some time.140  Yet, little change has been made to 
 
 135. Id. (“The [asylum] officer never follows-up to clarify if ‘Sanchez and Ysavelita’ 
is the name of a town, neighborhood, [] apartment complex or the location of the 
friend’s home where she initially fled after Holguin beat and raped her.”). 
 136. Jimenez Ferreira v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 803, 806 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 137. Id. at 807; accord Brief for Petitioner, supra note 93, at 3 (“The Dominican 
police provided essentially no protection to Ms. Jimenez, despite the complaint she 
filed with them following the first instance of abuse, and the many complaints Ms. 
Jimenez’s mother filed after Holguin sent her threatening letters.”). 
 138. See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 3, Jimenez Ferreira v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 803 
(7th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-2603) (“Ms. Jimenez was expected to disclose intimate details 
of abuse—including rape—to government agents when her prior experience with 
police in the Dominican Republic was negative and would likely have engendered 
mistrust of the authorities.”). 
 139. See Jimenez Ferreira, 831 F.3d at 809. 
 140. See, e.g., ABA COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION 
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note 51, at 507–508; Lustig, supra note 115, at 81–82. 
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correct the backlogged and politically shifting nature of the 
immigration system.141  Within the context of the current system, 
circuit courts should follow the approach utilized by the Seventh 
Circuit in Jimenez Ferreira v. Lynch and assess the quality of 
asylum interviews and the notes from said interviews in order to 
decide the level of weight and credence the notes ought to be given 
in determining the applicant’s credibility.  This could be 
accomplished by circuits establishing their own factors to consider 
in assessing the quality of the interview and notes, or by adopting 
the four nonexclusive factors utilized by the Third Circuit and 
adopted by the Seventh Circuit:  (1) whether the record of the 
interview is a verbatim transcript of the conversation, or simply a 
summary; (2) whether follow-up questions were asked in order to 
get more details relating to the asylum claim; (3) whether the 
applicant is reluctant to talk to government officials due to negative 
past experiences with government officials in their home country; 
and (4) whether the applicant’s answers sound as though they 
understood the questions being asked of them.142 
The benefit of utilizing the aforementioned factors is that it 
first requires the immigration judge to determine whether it would 
be fair to base an adverse credibility finding on inconsistencies in 
the asylum officer’s notes, or between the notes and the applicant’s 
testimony.  If the notes are simply a summary of a more detailed 
conversation, or if the asylum officer failed to ask relevant follow-
up questions, these flaws should not be held against the applicant 
as a blemish on his or her character or credibility.  Utilizing these 
factors will better aid judges in making credibility determinations 
based on the applicant’s own inconsistencies and discrepancies, 
rather than inconsistencies due to flaws in the process. 
Additional measures should be taken to train judges on the 
effects that coping with trauma may have on an applicant’s ability 
to provide a linear narrative.  Asylum is different from many other 
claims because the applicants often have no corroborating evidence 
and no documents proving persecution.  Thus, their claim comes 
down to their testimony.  Moreover, the applicant has much—such 
as their life and future—riding on the immigration judge’s decision.  
 
 141. Some scholars advocate for asylum claims to be handled in a non-adversarial 
system by expanding the current asylum offices and adjudicating the claims in a less 
confrontational hearing.  Others prefer the idea of categorizing the immigration 
court system as an Article III court, which would lessen the effects of federal political 
shifts.  Another option would be to create a specialty court specifically for asylum 
claims.  Paskey, supra note 51, at 514–515. 
 142. See Moab v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting 
Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 180 (2d Cir. 2004)). 
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Measures like training immigration judges on the ways in which 
survivors cope with trauma and the impacts this may have on their 
testimony, training immigration judges and asylum officers on 
implicit bias, and funding additional judicial clerks may help 
address the issues raised in this note.  In such high stakes cases, it 
is extremely important that immigration judges are given the 
necessary tools to most effectively perform the duties of their 
position. 
